Debating “Globalization” and “Deglobalization”

Roundtable Session: Debating “Globalization” and “Deglobalization”

Hilton Union Square, Golden Gate 6

Chair:

Jingyi Song, State University of New York, College at Old Westbury

Speakers:

Qiang Fang, University of Minnesota Duluth

Patrick Fuliang Shan, Grand Valley State University

Jingyi Song, State University of New York, College at Old Westbury

Yi Ren, Harvard University Fairbank Center

Roundtable Description

International trade across the continents started before the common era when silk and spices became early commodities. Human migration across national borders sped up cultural exchanges. The interdependency of the world has grown with increasing technological advancements, economic integration, and cultural interactions, signifying several waves of globalization. Meanwhile, particularly in recent years, forces of nationalism and security concerns have led to disengagement and conflicts in some parts of the world. “Globalization,” a trendy word with a great deal of economic potency and cross-cultural currency, has been challenged amidst rising nationalisms, a worldwide pandemic and a reconfiguration of the geopolitical landscape. Indeed, “de-globalization” has recently entered the popular lexicon. Now, more than ever, seems to a time that begs the answer to an urgent question as to what defines and constitutes globalization. “Brexit” and the looming unravelling of “Chimerica” notwithstanding, the process of integration seems to be accelerating in other parts of the world. Does the new phenomenon validate the old Chinese saying that “those long divided shall be united and those long united will be divided – such is the way of the universe,” and does it challenge a Western-centered view of globalization in the first place? Or does it symptomize a new round of ideological confrontations and economic conflicts in a troubled world? Scholars at this roundtable make concerted efforts at dissecting the meaning and significance of globalization/deglobalization by examining historical patterns and parallels in the hope of making sense of the global transformations.

Roundtable Participants’ Points of Intervention

Patrick Fuliang Shan, “Globalization and the Dissemination of ‘Democracy” in Modern China”

Democracy was not Chinese but imported to China around 1900. Nevertheless, “democracy” has been attractive to the Chinese who interpreted, practiced, and adapted it in their landscape. Sun Yat-sen fought for the American style democracy. After the 1911 Revolution, a nation-wide election resulted in the organization of an American style Congress (though shortly). After that, the Chinese seldom stop pursuing “democracy.” Political figures, including Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, and others, all claimed that their government was a “democracy.” This paper explores the impact of globalization upon China by a particular focus on the Chinese absorption of “democracy” and their political maneuvers for “democracy.” 

Qiang Fang, “The Paradox of Globalization”   

In the past several years, the often acclaimed and expected “globalization” has suffered major setbacks as the United States and its European and Asian allies have tried to decouple their trade and technology from China. One notable example is the US block of selling cutting-age chips to China to delay for the least and to stop for the best China’s swift development of its advanced weaponry and navy that have already outstripped the speed of the West. The Western move has triggered fear of a deglobalization. In hindsight, however, from Britain’s ban on exporting its steam engine technology in the early 19th century to Western states’ elevation of their tariff in the wake of the Great Depression and the mostly separated trade and technological exchange between the two blocs in the Cold War, we can clearly find that the so-called “globalization” has never fully existed. My preliminary argument is that the current “deglobalization” could best be understood as an “exclusive or selective globalization” that may plunge the world into two or more regional or small-sized “globalized” camps with similar social and political systems.

Jingyi Song, “Regional instability and the perpetuity of the Military-Industrial Complex” 

In the midst of an ongoing debate about globalization vs. deglobalization, regional conflicts and wars have thrown the world into a state of disarray with intensifying military buildup and a looming arms race.  While the Russo-Ukraine crisis is raging on and the Taiwan Strait is becoming a renewed hot spot of geopolitical and potentially military conflicts between the U.S. and China, the American Military-Industrial Complex has profited handsomely from the demands for a variety of war-related products.  Warned of the dangers of its “unwarranted influence” by President Eisenhower in the early 1960s, such an infrastructure, intangible as it may be, has morphed into a colossal enterprise six decades later.  Defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman have, historically and contemporarily, made hefty profits during times of heightened demands for weapons and military technologies.  This discussion focuses on the role of the American Military-Industrial Complex in wielding powerful influences in the political sphere, which have in turn helped to shape the making of American foreign policy and led to massive increases of military spending and, consequently, extensive US involvement in military conflicts overseas.  According to a Forbes article, one third of the world’s military sales in 2022 came from the top five American manufactures, amounting to $192 billion.  Arguably, this enormous Complex has contributed to the erosion of globalization with its role in intensifying regional conflicts.

Yi Ren: “Chinese Propaganda Amid Globalization and Deglobalization”

In today’s era of intertwined globalization and deglobalization, understanding the complexities of information dissemination is crucial. Propaganda, a potent instrument for shaping public opinion, provides a unique lens to examine these global dynamics. While modern propaganda is rooted in Western wartime experiences, its manifestations in other settings, such as China, merit investigation. I will first investigate the historical trajectories of propaganda in both Western and Chinese contexts, demonstrating that Chinese propaganda was neither iconoclastic nor xenophobic. Instead, its conception and implementation in China were shaped by continuous and intricate intercultural exchanges and adaptations. This research further highlights that globalization and deglobalization are interconnected, synchronous processes affecting communication tools and public opinion, which deepens our comprehension of the multifaceted nature of global dynamics.

Negotiations, Compromise, and Social Stability

“Negotiations, Compromise, and Social Stability: A Historical Reappraisal of Xi Jinping’s First Ten Years (2012-2022)”

Hilton Union Square, Union Square 19&20

Chair: Zhaojin Zeng, Texas A&M University-San Antonio

Papers:

Sino-US Relations Under Xi Jinping

Xiaobing Li, University of Central Oklahoma

China’s U-Turn to Personalistic Rule: Xi Jinping’s Centralization of Power

Xiaojia Hou, San Jose State University

Towards a More Joint Strategy: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms and Militia Reconstruction

Lei Duan, Sam Houston State University

Understanding the “Rule of Law” in Xi’s China

Qiang Fang, University of Minnesota Duluth

Comment: Guo Wu, Allegheny College

Panel Abstract

Xi Jinping has been China’s top leader for over a decade and has commenced his third five-year term since March 2023. His ten-year presidency (2012-2022) has enormously impacted China as well as the world. Henceforth, it is necessary for historians to reflect over his first ten years and to offer in-depth analysis of his social, political, and diplomatic policies along with their impact on China and the global community.  The four papers in this panel are intended to offer an analysis of Xi Jinping’s presidency by focusing on U.S.-China relations, interpreting Xi’s centralization of power, evaluating his reforms of China’s armed forces with his moves for military reconstruction, and assessing his reforms in the legal realm. The diverse topics in this panel will enable us to obtain a clear panorama of Xi Jinping’s decade-long governance over one of the largest countries in the world.  

Paper Abstracts

Xiaobing Li, “Sino-U.S. Relations under Xi Jinping”

Xi Jinping seems to be facing the similar challenges as Mao did in 1950, while he has to maintain the legitimacy of the CCP in the party-state, fight against Taiwan’s pro-independence movement, continue economic reforms, and improve the PLA’s capacity in modern warfare, including an effective nuclear deterrence like the one adopted by the former Soviet Union against US superior military power. Nevertheless, China may replay the game of “strategic triangulation” by establishing a new China-US-Europe triangle structure and bringing the US back to the game table to replay the “China card.” There is, however, a possibility of a tragic repetition in the development of a new cold war between the United States and China, if the latter continues its effort in creating “one world, two systems.” In China’s bi-polar world, one system is the current American-centered community and the other is a China-centered system. With no single enemy to unite against, and with the PRC emerging as a major economic power, the relationship between the U.S. and China arrives at a historical crossroad. Trump made a fundamental change in US policy toward China by terminating the “common ground” principle and removing the “China card.” Perceiving China as the major threat to the United States, Washington deems it necessary to fight back against China as its potential enemy whenever it could. After taking office, Biden has continued Trump’s hardline policy and describes China as the “strategic competitor” of the U.S..

Xiaojia Hou, “China’s U-turn to Personalistic Rule: Xi Jinping’s Centralization of Power”

Three generations of Chinese leadership after Mao Zedong had strived to establish collective leadership, decentralize authority, and balance the power between the party and state. But since Xi Jinping’s ascent as general secretary of the CCP in 2012, he has reversed the trend of de-centralization. My paper investigates how Xi Jinping perceives party-state relationships and examines the way he reconstructs the decision-making processes to reclaim more power from the state while elevating his own authority within the party. It in particular attempts to analyze these changes from a historical lens and explore Xi Jinping’s sources of legitimacy and of inspiration from the past. For example, what lessons did Xi learn from the fall of the Soviet Union? How did he employ Mao’s practices of purging and instigating mass movement for political maneuvers? How did he revive Mao’s rituals to control official narratives, and use national security to censor public opinion? These are the questions that this paper intends to address.

Lei Duan, “Towards a More Joint Strategy: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms and Militia Reconstruction”

Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China’s armed forces have undergone unprecedented reforms in their scale and scope of organizational and strategic changes. For the goal of modernizing and strengthening the Chinese military, Xi has adopted the most sweeping and radical reforms with a focus on efficiency, technological innovation, and joint operations. Seeing the formation of a powerful military as an integral part of the China Dream, Xi has shifted the national security strategy to a defensive-offensive one. China has also strengthened its militia organization and training works. In particular, China’s maritime militia has undergone significant building and modernization. Many sources suggest that China’s armed fishing militia has dual-use capabilities for both military and civilian purposes. As an official component of China’s armed forces, the maritime militia has been integrated closely with the regular navy and has played an increasing role in supporting China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. This paper aims to take a fresh look at the Chinese military reform by focusing on the cooperation and coordination of the People’s Liberation Army and the militia force. It suggests that the government has integrated both regular military and paramilitary forces in pursuit of China’s ambition.

Qiang Fang, “Understanding the ‘Rule of Law’ in Xi’s China”

Since Chinese leader Xi Jinping took power in late 2012, many scholars around the world have studied his policies. Most of them have focused their research on Xi Jinping’s political, foreign, and economic policies; only a few of them have briefly examined his legal policies and practices. Zheng Yongnian, for example, went too far as to argue in 2016 that Xi aimed to establish the rule of law in China. His only evidence was Xi’s proclamation in early 2014 that law was the last hope for social justice and he wanted Chinese officials to comply with law. However, as evidenced in a cluster of eminent legal practices from 2014 to 2022, Xi and Chinese law enforcements had often flouted law in campaigns against corrupt officials, rights lawyers, and dissidents. More important, Chinese officials and police have often used extra-legal means such as forced and arbitrary detention, beating, and incarceration navigating minorities and contrarians in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. This study will be the first serious one to delve into Xi Jinping’s legal policies in prominent cases such as anti-corruption campaigns, harsh and arbitrary crackdowns of rights lawyers, and the kidnapping of several Hong Kong book sellers. I argue that the legal policies and practices of Xi Jinping’s “rule of law” with Chinese characteristics (zhongguo shi fazhi) should better be referred to as “Rule of My Law” as the CCP under Xi is selective in adopting ancient legalism, which in many aspects go farther and bolder than the law during earlier periods.

China Under Xi Jinping’s Presidency

“China Under Xi Jinping’s Presidency (2012-2022): A Historical Assessment”

Hilton Union Square, Union Square 19&20

Chair: Jingyi Song, State University of New York, College at Old Westbury

Papers:

Media in China, 2012–22

Guolin Yi, Providence College

From Trade War to New Cold War: Popular Nationalism and the Global Times on Weibo, 2018–20

Mao Lin, Georgia Southern University

Xi’s Campaigns to Fight Pollution, Climate Change, and the COVID-19 Pandemic

Qiong Zhang, Wake Forest University

What Did the CCP Learn from the Past? An Analysis of Xi Jinping’s Dexterous Utilization of History

Patrick Fuliang Shan, Grand Valley State University

Comment: Lei Duan, Sam Houston State University

Panel Abstract

Xi Jinping started his presidency as the supreme leader of the People’s Republic of China in 2012. Precisely ten years have passed since his assumption of that vitally important position. Needless to say, his leadership in China and his influence upon the world beg our urgent historical interpretation. This panel features papers from four scholars teaching at American universities. By focusing on diverse topics, the four scholars will explore Xi Jinping’s significant role in leading one of the largest and most populous countries in the entire global community. The papers probe the sway of media in China, examine the relations between China and the U.S., analyze China’s environmental and pandemic control, and interpret Xi’s use of history for political maneuvers. Collectively, the four scholars demonstrate the new historical trends that have taken shape during Xi’s first ten years as the paramount leader of China.

Paper Abstracts

Guolin Yi “Media in China, 2012-2022”

Between 2012 and 2022, the Chinese government used a series of measures to consolidate its control of the media. This paper studies the media policies of China by focusing on two sides: what the CCP tried to prevent and what it tried to promote. On the one hand, it passed laws and regulations that prohibit private enterprises from newsgathering and broadcasting and adds a new ban on hosting news-related forums. It also consolidated the control over online commentaries by shutting down VIP accounts that stepped out of the line. On the other, print media and the main portal website like Sina, Sohu, and NetEase have been involved in the promotion of Xi Jinping’s cult of personality by highlighting his images and quotes. By looking at these measures, the paper demonstrates the status of media environment in China under Xi Jinping.

Mao Lin, “From Trade War to New Cold War: Popular Nationalism and the Global Times on Weibo, 2018-2020”

The United States and the People’s Republic of China have been waging what the Chinese social media called “an epic trade war in human history” since early 2018. This ongoing trade war has attracted unprecedented attention from all types of Chinese media. The paper examines how popular nationalism has evolved over time and shaped China’s response to the trade war, focusing on the influential Global Times and how it used the social media platform, Weibo, to frame the trade war. During the early months of the trade war, China’s response was largely defensive. The Chinese public opinion claimed China as an innocent victim of the trade war, initiated by a reckless Trump administration. Many, especially those in social media, were also optimistic, believing that the trade war would be over soon once the U.S. government came to its senses. After Washington imposed sanctions on Huawei, a popular Chinese high-tech company, the public opinion shifted to an offensive mode. Many now argued that America was not looking for fair trade policies but trying to block China’s rise as a global power. Furthermore, the Chinese popular nationalism started to argue that China’s model of development was superior to America’s liberal democracy. Other issues such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang, and the South China Sea further confounded the bilateral relationship and led to the rise of popular nationalism.

Qiong Zhang, “Xi’s Campaigns to Fight Pollution, Climate Change, and the Covid-19 Pandemic”

The winter of transition from Hu Jintao’s administration to Xi Jinping’s witnessed an unusually intense and prolonged smog that blanketed an area of approximately 1.43 million square kilometers in China. Dubbed the “airpocalypse” or “airmageddon” by some expatriates in China, this smog event is said to have sent a daily average of 9,000 emergency visits to Beijing Children’s Hospital during its peak week, half of which for respiratory illnesses.  The incident highlighted the profound environmental and public health challenges facing Xi’s administration. While inheriting a booming economy that had surged to become the world’s second-largest by 2010, the administration was also confronted with the severe consequences of such rapid growth: stark environmental degradation and significant human tolls. The Xi administration’s resilience was further tested with the outbreak of Covid-19, an unprecedented global pandemic in the past century, with the first known cases surfacing in Wuhan, China. This paper zooms in on how Xi and his administration coped with these crises, highlighting, on the one hand, areas of continuity between his environmental and public health governance and those of his predecessors, and on the other, the new coping strategies that have emerged as unique hallmarks of his leadership.

Patrick Fuliang Shan, “What Did the CCP Learn from the Past? An Analysis of Xi Jinping’s Dexterous Utilization of History”

China is one of the longest civilizations in the entire world, and its historical resource is so rich that rulers in the past millennia have utilized it for their political maneuvers. Ever since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the CCP under his leadership has used this wealth of resources for initiating new political policies. Xi launched the revival of the Silk Road by adopting the Road and Belt Initiative. He called for the great resurgence of the Chinese nation purporting to restore China’s glorious history. He often led the Politburo members to visit the communist historical sites to reaffirm their oaths for defending the communist faith. Many of Xi’s new political terminologies are related to history. This paper investigates Xi’s intentions, strategies, and tactics of using history to legitimize his policies, defend his moves, and woo support to his regime.

Like Cattle and Horses

“Like Cattle and Horses: Japanese Informal Empire, Communist Revolution,  and the Industrial Labor Movement in Republican China”

Hilton Union Square, Union Square 19&20

Chair: Zhiguo Yang, University of Wisconsin-River Falls

Papers:

Informal Empire, Nation-Building, and the Chinese Labor Movement in the Zaikabō of Qingdao, 1923–37

Zhiguo Yang, University of Wisconsin-River Falls

Getting Off at an Earlier Station: Cotton Mill Workers, the Communists, and the Shanghai Summer Strikes of 1926

Shensi Yi, Chinese University of Hong Kong

The Politics of Seeing: Female Workers’ Evening Schools in 1930s Shanghai

Miao Feng, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Comment: Dandan Chen, State University of New York, Farmingdale State College

Panel Abstract

This panel is the first of two CHUS paper panels devoted to examining modern Chinese labor history proposed for the 2024 AHA, focusing on mainland China during the Republican era (1912–1949). The geographic context of the events studied here is Shanghai and Qingdao, where Japanese capital investment stimulated a rapid growth of textile and other industries in the first three decades of the twentieth century and where labor-capital disputes created China’s first breeding ground for modern industrial union movement. The three presenters examine the intriguing interplay between Chinese Communist movement, Nationalist labor policies, non-political and private actors such as YWCA, Japanese imperialism and its economic representatives in China, and Chinese factory workers in shaping the agenda and characteristics of the labor upheavals in the 1920s and ’30s.  Labor historian S. A. Smith wrote Like Cattle and Horses: Nationalism and Labor in Shanghai, 1895–1927 to connect “the narrative of Chinese nationalism and the narrative of the labor movement.” Likewise, the presenters in this panel will offer three case studies to reveal the interconnectedness of different casual factors for a burgeoning labor movement that is anything but monolithic in terms of agenda, strategy, political affiliation and influence, and outcome.  They will also illustrate that as a component of modern Chinese history, applying multidisciplinary and multiperspective approach to the investigation of labor history can lead to a better understanding of both. 

 Paper Abstracts

Zhiguo Yang, “Informal Empire, Nation-Building, and Chinese Labor Movement in Zaikabō of Qingdao, 1923 – 1937”

After capturing Germany’s Leased Territory of Jiaozhou in Shandong at the start of World War I, Japan ruled this former German colony in China until 1922.  During this eight-year period, not only did Japan turn Qingdao, the administrative center of the Jiaozhou Territory, into a bastion of Japanese textile industry in northern China, it also built an economic empire in Shandong by controlling the Qingdao-Jinan Railway and the mining industry along its line.  However, after Japan returned the Jiaozhou Territory to China according to the Shandong Treaty signed at the Washington Naval Conference in 1922, that empire was reduced to the six Japanese cotton mills, or zaikabō, in Qingdao.

The largest employer of Chinese factory workers in Shandong, these cotton mills became a breeding ground of the burgeoning industrial labor movement in China from the 1920s onward. In times of labor unrest, Japan either resorted to threat of military intervention to pressure the Chinese government to end it or, when that failed, landed troops to crack down on the Chinese strikers and luddites. Facing such a menace, the Chinese government in Qingdao attempted to preempt Japanese military intervention by alternating between violent suppression of militant union movement and brokering reconciliation of Japanese mill owners with their Chinese employees over labor-capital disputes.  Narrating the history of labor in Japanese cotton mills in Qingdao in this context, this paper illustrates how the tug of war between Japan’s defense of its entrenched economic interests against modern unionism and China’s effort to consolidate its home rule in a former foreign concession shaped the labor movement in Japanese cotton mills in Qingdao and made it a focal point in the Sino-Japanese relations during the Nationalist Decade.

Shensi Yi, “Getting off at an Earlier Station: Cotton Mill Workers, the Communists, and the Shanghai Summer Strikes of 1926”

In June 1926, Shanghai cotton mill workers staged strikes at Japanese-owned factories (Naigai Wata Kaisha) in Xiaoshadu, the western area of Shanghai, protesting the dismissal of workers accused of arson in the workshop. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) recognized that Chinese workers should align their actions with their labor movement strategy and tried to control the scale of the strikes. In August, responding to an incident where Japanese sailors killed a Chinese man, the CCP redirected its strategy to launch a large-scale combined strike, catering to Chinese laborers’ demands of Japanese employers, but not accounting for practical market conditions at that time. Drawing on a variety of sources including the CCP internal documentary collection, this article reveals that dissidence in leadership, weaknesses in grassroots organizations, and unrealized alliances made it impossible for the Communists, the so-called vanguard of the working class, to lead the summer strike. Contrarily, the cotton workers coerced the Communists and the labor unions under their control to maximize workers’ benefits. By mid-September, the attempted strike had failed to take place, causing a serious setback for the Communist organization in Shanghai. Compared to the CCP’s improvisation and confusion, the Japanese capitalists took advantage of the favorable economic climate of 1926 to launch their countermeasures, ultimately triumphing over the Communists and workers.

Miao Feng, “The Politics of Seeing: Female Workers’ Evening Schools in 1930s Shanghai”

Workers’ schools were important channels for revolutionaries to approach and mobilize workers in the history of Chinese revolution. Previous studies tend to subsume workers’ education to the narratives of labor movements led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Such studies rarely examine the gender aspect of workers’ education. This paper focuses on the education program founded by the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) for women cotton and tobacco workers in 1930s Shanghai. This evening school program became the cradle of not only future labor movement leaders, but also future revolutionary cultural workers who sang and performed for the worker and peasant masses. Based on rich archival research, this paper shows that workers’ education was contended in the 1930s; various forces vied for workers’ education including social education programs, the rural re-construction programs, and the CCP revolutionary underground forces. The paper argues that the reason for the success of the YWCA program is the schoolteachers’ concentration on the everyday experiences of their worker students. The YWCA organizers frequently recruited literacy, drama and singing teachers among the underground revolutionary cultural workers who gathered in the city after 1933. This was a time when these revolutionary intellectuals demanded the popularization of literature and arts. These intellectuals actively interacted with workers, considered their feelings and obtained their feedback on art works. The schools’ singing and drama classes creatively revised the previously elite-centric art content and form, allowing workers to sing, hear, act and see their own experiences. This experience of representing and presenting workers’ own experiences greatly helped female workers develop compassion as well as self-reliance. It also gained great trust and support from the YWCA organizers who had aimed their labor education at nurturing women workers’ self-reliance and autonomy. This research thus complicates the previous narrative of labor education history.